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Abstract
Background: During the Suharto era public funding of health in Indonesia was low and the health
services were tightly controlled by the central government; district health staff had practically no
discretion over expenditure. Following the downfall of President Suharto there was a radical
political, administrative and fiscal decentralization with delivery of services becoming the
responsibility of district governments. In addition, public funding for health services more than
doubled between 2001 and 2006. It was widely expected that services would improve as district
governments now had both more adequate funds and the responsibility for services. To date there
has been little improvement in services. Understanding why services have not improved requires
careful study of what is happening at the district level.
Methods: We collected information on public expenditure on health services for the fiscal year
2006 in 15 districts in Java, Indonesia from the district health offices and district hospitals. Data
obtained in the districts were collected by three teams, one for each province. Information on
district government revenues were obtained from district public expenditure databases maintained
by the World Bank using data from the Ministry of Finance.
Results: The public expenditure information collected in 15 districts as part of this study indicates
district governments are reliant on the central government for as much as 90% of their revenue;
that approximately half public expenditure on health is at the district level; that at least 40% of
district level public expenditure on health is for personnel, almost all of them permanent civil
servants; and that districts may have discretion over less than one-third of district public
expenditure on health; the extent of discretion over spending is much higher in district hospitals
than in the district health office and health centers. There is considerable variation between
districts.
Conclusion: In contrast to the promise of decentralization there has been little increase in the
potential for discretion at the district level in managing public funds for health – this is likely to be
an important reason for the lack of improvement in publicly funded health services. Key decisions
about money are still made by the central government, and no one is held accountable for the
performance of the sector – the district blames the center and the central ministries (and their
ministers) are not accountable to district populations.
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Background
Following the downfall of President Suharto in 1998,
Indonesia underwent a radical political, administrative
and fiscal decentralization [1]. Under the new laws and
regulations local governments have responsibility for
delivery of services in a number of sectors including
health. In practice, the actual functional responsibilities of
the various levels of government are still unclear. What is
clear, nevertheless, is that districts have the major respon-
sibility for delivery of health services.
Assessments of the Indonesian health system over the last
decades have consistently pointed to the low levels of
public funding as one of the main reasons for the disap-
pointing performance of the sector [2-4]. For the 15 years
before 2000 Indonesia spent less than 0.5% of GDP on
health [3], levels considerably below those of other coun-
tries in the region [2]. Since 2000, besides the political
and administrative changes, there has also been a dra-
matic increase in public funding of the health sector. Real
public expenditure on health more than doubled between
2000 and 2006 (Figure 1), and doubled as a proportion of
GDP [2].
Overall, total district public expenditure on health
increases with total district revenue (Figure 2). However,
this Figure also illustrates that at any given level of reve-
nue per capita there is wide variation in per capita district
expenditure on health. For example, at a public revenue
level of Rp 500,000 per capita, district public expenditure
on health per capita varies from less than Rp 20,000 to
almost Rp 60,000, a threefold range. District governments
have the discretion to allocate a portion of their revenue
as they see fit and the range of expenditure on health indi-
cates that they are making clear choices between sectors.
At the same time, most districts have seen increases in
public expenditure on health, even if moderate in scope in
some cases.
It was widely expected that these increased funds, together
with decentralization and the hope of greater freedom to
change budget allocations at the district level, would lead
to improvement in the delivery of services as the changed
accountability relationships resulted in services more
attuned to local needs. The results to date are mixed.
Immunization rates remain low [5,6] and have shown lit-
tle, if any improvement in the period between 2002–03
and 2006 [Heywood, P. Changes in health system per-
formance in 10 districts in Java, Indonesia, unpublished.];
utilization of ambulatory care services is also low and self-
treatment remains the most common response to illness
for many [3]; there is great variation between districts in
the efficiency with which resources are used [5]; and
World Bank assessments across districts indicate no rela-
tionship between public expenditure on health and
immunization coverage or presence of a skilled health
provider at birth delivery [3]. The overall quality of care
(as measured by knowledge of clinical guidelines) is low
[7].
Understanding why district governments are unable to
improve health services even though decentralization has
provided them increased funds and, apparently, the
authority to make any changes needed to do so, requires
careful studies of how districts are functioning. This
includes the way in which the sector is funded at the dis-
trict level as well as the how those funds are allocated and
utilized. Therefore this paper looks at public funds1 avail-
able at the district level for health and the way in which
they are used – this is important for assessment of the
effects of decentralization and if we are to improve the
Trend in real public health expenditure, Indonesia 2001– 2006 Figure 1
Trend in real public health expenditure, Indonesia 
2001–2006.
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Total district public expenditure on health per capita (rou- tine + development) vs total district public revenue per cap- ita, 67 districts in East, Central and West Java, 2006 Figure 2
Total district public expenditure on health per capita 
(routine + development) vs total district public reve-
nue per capita, 67 districts in East, Central and West 
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allocation and utilization of public funds for health by
districts.
Before decentralization almost all resources were trans-
ferred to district governments through centrally-specified
earmarked grants. The largest of these grants covered civil
service salaries and recurrent expenditures; an additional
grant was used to finance development spending. Under
the new system introduced in 2001 districts are still reliant
on central-district transfers for more than 90% of their
revenues. Although there was an early belief that earmark-
ing would be a thing of the past2 the current reality is quite
different as is apparent from Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 lists
and defines the various sources of funds for district gov-
ernment under the new system. The relative importance of
the various sources for district revenues in 2005 is shown
in Table 2. Aggregating across all districts and cities in the
country, the most important is the General Allocation
Fund (DAU) which accounts for 56% of the total. Untied
funds come from own-source revenue (PAD) which con-
tributes 9% of total, shared taxes 11%, shared natural
resource revenues 12%; and tied grants under the Special
Allocation Fund (DAK) 3%, and from the central line
ministries, 9%. For districts on Java shared natural
resource revenues are essentially zero3. On paper the Gen-
eral Allocation Fund (DAU) is untied. However, the real-
ity is that the first call on these funds is to pay the salaries
and benefits of permanent civil servants who are hired
and fired by the central government but assigned to work
in the districts; across the country this accounts for half
the DAU. Across the country and all sectors, less than half
the revenues of district governments are untied; this
untied portion is made up of own-source revenue (9%),
shared taxes (11%) and half the DAU (28%); the propor-
Table 1: Public funds and flows for health sector at district level.
Level of government Source Flow Description
District Own source revenue 
(Pendapatan Asli Daerah – 
PAD)
Local revenue – included in APBD District revenue derived from local 
taxes and natural resources and user 
charges – for health sector refers 
mostly to user charges at district 
hospital and health centers. Allocation 
decided by district government and 
approved by district parliament.
District Shared revenues -. Ministry of Finance, through the National 
Budget (APBN) to district – included in 
APBD
Taxes levied by the central government 
(especially oil, gas and personal income 
tax) and now shared according to an 
agreed formula. Sectoral allocation 
decided by district government and 
approved by district parliament.
District General Allocation Fund 
(Dana Alokasi Umum – DAU)
Ministry of Finance through the National 
Budget (APBN) to district – included in 
APBD
Partially tied grant from central 
government direct to district 
government – first priority is payment 
of salaries of permanent civil servants, 
allocation of remainder decided by 
district government and approved by 
district parliament.
District Special Allocation Fund 
(Dana Alokasi Khusus – DAK)
Ministry of Finance through the National 
Budget (APBN) to district – included in 
APBD
Tied grant for specific sectors from the 
central government direct to the 
district government. Can be used for 
construction, rehabilitation and 
equipment for primary care facilities. 
Requires 10% matching funding from 
the district budget.
Center Deconcentration funds (Dekon) Ministry of Finance to Ministry of Health 
(via APBN) direct to District Health Office 
and utilized with approval of Provincial 
Health Office.
Tied grants from the Ministry of Health 
to be used for centrally-specified 
sectoral activities. District proposals 
for use of these funds must be 
approved by province.
Center Askeskin From Ministry of Health straight to hospital 
or health center (with approval of District 
Health Office). Included in APBN.
Tied funds to cover costs of providing 
free healthcare to the poor.
Center Tugas Pembantuan Ministry of Finance direct to district hospital 
(with approval of MOH). Included in APBN.
Tied to physical assets, infrastructure 
and equipment
Center PTT Directly from Ministry of Finance, on 
recommendation of Ministry of Health, to 
personal account of staff member.
Tied funds for salaries and allowances 
for contract staff.
Source: Adapted from World Bank [3].Health Research Policy and Systems 2009, 7:5 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/7/1/5
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tion untied may be even lower in some sectors and dis-
tricts. This is a long way from the earlier promise of
decentralization and even some of the more recent state-
ments by, among others, the World Bank [3], which states
that "....since decentralization districts decide how to
spend their own resources."
Whilst these national level figures across all sectors give a
general picture, assessing the extent to which the health
sector in a particular district has discretion over their pub-
lic resources is difficult, made more so by the lack of accu-
rate and detailed information on sectoral expenditure
within districts. In addition, the extent of discretion may
vary between different health institutions at the district
level, especially hospitals as compared to health centers
(HC) and the district health office (DHO)4. Hospitals
operate quite independently of the district health office
and health centers and the extent of their claim on the
public budget derived from various sources might be
expected to be different and vary across districts.
In essence, the public funds for health over which the dis-
trict has discretion appear in the district budget for health.
However, as discussed above, some of the funds in the dis-
trict health budget are earmarked by the central govern-
ment. The proportion so earmarked may vary between
districts and could be used as an index of the potential dis-
tricts have, or do not have, to vary expenditure within
their total budget according to local needs.
This paper will, for a sample of districts: describe district
revenue by source and basic expenditure of funds on
health, including the distribution of expenditure across
different health institutions and the proportion devoted
to salaries; determine the extent to which districts poten-
tially have discretion over use of the funds; and assess var-
iation between districts.
The work reported here is part of a project to understand
what is happening at the district level in the Indonesian
health sector. It includes a basic enumeration of the
human resources and the health facilities in which they
work and deliver services as well as estimation of the
financial resources available to health through the public
purse at the district level. Our aim, in a sample of 15 dis-
tricts in Java, is to: (i) enumerate the stock of health facil-
ities (public and private) in the health sector in 2006; (ii)
enumerate the stock of human resources (public and pri-
vate) in the health sector in 2006 trained to provide care
and treatment for illness – in Indonesia this means doc-
tors, nurses and midwives; and (iii) estimate the funds
(public and private) spent on health care in the course of
2006. The results will be reported in separate papers –
those for health personnel and health facilities have been
reported elsewhere, in [8] and [Heywood P, Harahap N:
Health facilities at the district level in Indonesia, unpub-
lished.], respectively. This paper reports on public financ-
ing for health.
Methods
As much of the information we wished to obtain is not
available from the central government we collected it in
the districts. This work concentrates on Java where 60% of
the Indonesian population live. Resources were sufficient
to allow data to be collected in 15 districts. To ensure rep-
resentation of the range of situations in Java, 5 districts
were chosen in each of West Java Province, Central Java
Province and East Java Province.
The 15 districts were selected as follows. Between 1997
and 2004 East Java Province and Central Java Province
were included in a World Bank Safe Motherhood Project
[9]. The endline data for this project were collected in 5
districts in each province (a total of 10 districts) at the
time of the 2002–03 Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS) [6]. The districts for the endline data collection
were selected purposively by the Safe Motherhood Project
team to illustrate the range of settings in which the project
was implemented. The sample size in these districts was
sufficient to provide district level estimates of the basic
indicators in the DHS. (The DHS was repeated in the same
districts, with oversampling, in 2007. A comparison of
2002–03 and 2007 DHS results for these 10 districts will
be presented in a separate paper. [Heywood, P. Changes
in health system performance in 10 districts in Java, Indo-
nesia, unpublished.]) West Java was not included in the
Table 2: Revenue sources for all districts and cities in Indonesia, 2005.
Source Amount (Rp billion) Share (%)
Own-source revenue 12,530 9
Shared taxes 15,122 11
Shared natural resource revenues 17,488 12
General Allocation Fund (DAU) 79,843 56
Special Allocation Fund (DAK) 4,628 3
Other revenue (including dekon, tugas pembantuan, PTT, Askeskin) 13,196 9
Total 142,807 100
Source: World Bank [2].Health Research Policy and Systems 2009, 7:5 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/7/1/5
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earlier Safe Motherhood Project. However, in 2007 over-
sampling for the DHS was carried out in 5 districts. The
districts were selected purposively to illustrate the range of
district settings in West Java. Table 3 shows the province,
population and number of sub-districts in each of the 15
districts included in this study. Using the World Bank clas-
sification [2] all 15 districts have low fiscal revenue per
capita; Cilacap and Subang have high Gross District Prod-
uct per capita, the other 13 districts all have low Gross
Development Product per capita.
Revenue data (total and source) for the districts for 2006
were obtained from the public finance database for Indo-
nesia (Realized Provincial and District Budget (APBD)
Database) [10] maintained by the World Bank Jakarta
Office using information from the Indonesian Ministry of
Finance. Information from this database represents allo-
cations, and not expenditure, to the districts.
Information on expenditure of public funds on health at
the district level for 2006 was obtained from records
maintained at the district health office and the district
hospital. The information includes expenditure of public
funds at the district level derived from the central govern-
ment, provincial government and district government.
The various sources of funds are defined in Table 1. The
primary source of data was the financial report on
expenditure5 for 2006 available at the district health office
and the district hospital. The primary informant in each
district health office and hospital was the chief finance
officer and/or the chief planning officer6; they were pro-
vided with a spreadsheet template (the template for data
from district health office and health centers is shown as
Additional File 1) for entering the data. A similar template
was used to collect information for district hospitals. Fur-
ther discussions with the informants were held once the
initial data had been collected to, where necessary, clarify
the spreadsheet entries and resolve any ambiguities.
The initial aim was to collect expenditure information
using a functional classification that included salaries and
remuneration, non-salary administrative activities, pro-
gram activities, civil works, drugs, and equipment sepa-
rately for the district health office, health centers, and
hospitals. However, with the exception of information on
salaries and remuneration, at least half the districts were
unable to provide this level of detail for the non-salary
items. Consequently, the data for each district has been
summarized as in two categories, 'salaries and remunera-
tion'7 and 'other'8 (see Additional File 1).
These data were collected by three teams, one for each
province, in 2007. The provincial team leaders were from,
and based in, the province, and had previous experience
in collecting health data at the district level.
Results and discussion
Revenue9
Nationally, real transfers to district governments almost
doubled between 2000 and 2006 [2]. Over the same
period real expenditure on health more than doubled
(Figure 1), the largest increase occurring between 2005
and 2006. The amount and sources of district revenue for
the districts in this study in 2006 are shown in Table 4 and
Figure 3. The proportion contributed by the general allo-
cation fund (DAU), 74%, is considerably higher than the
56% for the country overall (Table 2). For several of these
districts the contribution of DAU reaches 80%. The higher
proportion from the DAU for the districts studied here is
largely due to the very low contribution of shared natural
resource revenues for districts on Java (effectively zero)
compared to the high levels in some other districts.
Level of public spending on health at the district level
Across the 15 districts studied the overall level of public
expenditure for health at the district level is Rp 59,080 per
person per year. This is consistent with the per capita esti-
mate for the whole country derived from budget data
available at the national level – this macro approach
yields an estimate of Rp 62,332 per person per year at the
district level (Table 5).
There is wide variation between districts in per capita
expenditure of public funds on health – for these 15 dis-
tricts the range is from Rp 39,873 in Cilacap to Rp
104,355 in Pamekasan – see Tables 6, 7 and 8 which sum-
marize the main variables by district for West Java, Central
Java and East Java, respectively.
The broader context for these district level public funds is
that they represent 45% (Table 4) of the total health
Table 3: Basic information about the 15 districts included in this 
study.
Province District Population No. Sub-districts
West Java Ciamis 1458680 36
Cirebon 2134656 37
Garut 2274973 41
Subang 1402134 22
Sukabumi 2240901 45
Central Java Brebes 1727708 17
Cilacap 1717273 24
Jepara 1078037 14
Pemalang 1341422 14
Rembang 591786 14
East Java Jombang 1203716 21
Ngawi 857449 19
Pamekasan 782917 13
Sampang 801541 14
Trenggalek 682328 14Health Research Policy and Systems 2009, 7:5 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/7/1/5
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expenditure from public sources – for the remainder, 16%
of overall health expenditure is at the province level and
39% at the central level. Overall, then, the additional
expenditures at the province and central levels represent
more than Rp 70,000 per person per year in 2006. The dis-
trict level expenditures are primarily for the delivery of
publicly funded services while much of the central and
provincial level funds are for activities far removed from,
and which contribute little to, service delivery.
Sources of public funds for health at the district level
Taking the district as a whole, public financing derives
from three government sources – district government,
provincial government and central government. The
shares of these three sources are shown in Tables 6, 7 and
8, (which show the shares for the 5 districts in West Java,
Central Java and East Java, respectively). A summary
across the 15 districts is shown in Table 9. For the sector
as a whole, across these 15 districts, the central govern-
ment provides a little more than half the public funds
while the district government provides just over 40%. The
provincial government is not an important source of
funds for the districts and loans and grants account for
less than 5%. The variation in these shares between dis-
tricts is wide. Thus, the share of district government varies
from a low of 23% in Ciamis to a high of 63% in Rem-
bang. The contribution of central government varies from
a low of 36% in Rembang to a high of 76% in Ngawi.
Table 4: Revenue by source for 12 districts in West Java, Central Java and East Java, 2006
District Own-source 
revenue
Shared taxes and 
natural resource 
revenues
General allocation 
grant 
(Dana Alokasi 
Umum – DAU)
Special allocation 
grant 
(Dana Alokasi 
Khusus – DAK)
Other revenues Total
Ciamis 55,485,790,000 24,725,680,000 708,553,000,000 52,900,000,000 64,956,000,000 906,620,470,000
Cirebon 128,170,390,000 48,320,600,000 653,606,000,000 40,910,000,000 105,759,400,000 976,766,390,000
Subang 84,102,740,000 69,667,900,000 502,000,000,000 35,360,000,000 64,178,800,000 755,309,440,000
Sukabumi 80,315,580,000 41,076,300,000 684,475,000,000 38,050,000,000 104,084,400,000 948,001,280,000
Brebes 66,203,330,000 27,032,000,000 609,557,000,000 13,850,000,000 48,028,000,000 764,670,330,000
Cilacap 109,603,600,000 27,315,000,000 609,037,000,000 0 39,277,000,000 785,232,600,000
Jepara 104,870,200,000 21,748,190,000 403,160,000,000 26,080,000,000 58,750,200,000 614,608,590,000
Pemalang 76,015,840,000 19,879,900,000 458,847,000,000 27,760,000,000 31,822,000,000 614,324,740,000
Jombang 82,688,360,000 23,087,710,000 416,553,000,000 11,210,000,000 34,174,600,000 567,713,670,000
Ngawi 27,906,620,000 15,537,772,000 450,161,000,000 25,800,000,000 24,339,826,000 543,745,218,000
Pamekasan 41,001,839,000 15,962,000,000 373,618,000,000 26,130,000,000 19,295,320,000 476,007,159,000
Sampang 26,190,020,000 18,275,000,000 330,911,000,000 30,090,000,000 10,315,000,000 415,781,020,000
Total 882,554,309,000 352,628,052,000 6,200,478,000,000 328,140,000,000 604,980,546,000 8,368,780,907,000
Percent 12 districts 11 4 74 4 7 100
Source: World Bank public expenditure in Indonesia database [10]
Sources (%) of district revenue, 12 districts in East, Central and West Java, 2006 Figure 3
Sources (%) of district revenue, 12 districts in East, Central and West Java, 2006.
Own-source revenue
Shared taxes and natural
resource revenues
General allocation grant
(Dana Alokasi Umum - DAU)
Special allocation grant
(Dana Alokasi Khusus -
DAK)
Other revenues
Source: Data from (8). Health Research Policy and Systems 2009, 7:5 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/7/1/5
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How are the public funds for health at the district level 
spent?
The public funds at the district level are spent through
three health institutions – the district health office, health
centers, and the district public hospital. As the district
health office and health centers essentially operate as an
administrative and financial unit10 they are combined in
this analysis and referred to as DHO/HC. Across all 15 dis-
tricts the DHO/HC accounts for 57% of expenditure and
district hospitals for 43% (see Table 10). Again, there is
considerable variation between districts with the propor-
tion of district health expenditure accounted for by hospi-
tals varying from 24% in Ciamis to 64% in Jombang.
There is little reliable information at the district level on
which to base an analysis of expenditure by function. Cur-
rent attempts to develop a system of national health
accounts use budget allocations rather than expenditures
and have so far not adopted a standardized functional
classification of expenditures by function that would
allow comparison across studies and with other countries.
Further, and partly as a result of the failure to develop a
standardized system of accounts in the health sector, there
is considerable variation between districts in allocation of
particular expenditures to specific activities; as a result it is
not possible, so far, to make an accurate functional analy-
sis of expenditure. However, we do know that the largest
single item of expenditure at the hospital, health center
and district health office level is for salaries and
remuneration11. The proportion of public funds from dis-
trict and central government, and the overall total,
expended on salaries and remuneration by district is
shown in Table 11. Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect
of this table is the relative uniformity of the proportion of
the total expended on this function – it ranges from the
32% in Sukabumi and Sampang to 46% in Ciamis and
Jepara. Across all 15 districts the proportion of the total
expenditure on salaries and remuneration is 40%.
The proportion of funds for the DHO/HC and hospitals at
district level is shown in Table 12. Within this relatively
narrow range for the total there is great variation in the
proportion of salaries and remuneration contributed by
the district and central governments to the DHO/HC
(overall 16% from district and 84% from central funds)
and to hospitals (57% from district and 43% from the
center). In 2006, across these 15 districts we can summa-
Table 5: Public expenditures on health by level of government, 
2006
Level of government Total Per capita
Rp (billions) Rp (thousands) %
Central 12,190 54,664 39
Province 5,100 22,870 16
District 13,900 62,332 45
Total 31,190 139,865 100
Source: World Bank [3]; Authors' calculations. Population 2006 
assumed to be 223 million.
Table 6: Expenditure (Rupiah) of public funds in health sector of 5 districts in West Java Province by source of funds, 2006. (Note: 1 US 
$ is equal to approximately Rp. 10,000).
District Source of public expenditure Total
District government Provincial government Central government Other
Ciamis Total Rp. 19,320,039,814 6,398,592,632 50,010,761,286 7,479,602,817 83,208,996,549
Per Capita Rp. 13,245 4,387 34,285 5,128 57,044
%2 3 8 6 0 9 1 0 0
Cirebon Total Rp. 79,387,460,213 222,000,000 61,472,764,207 8,489,849,200 149,572,073,620
Per Capita Rp. 37,190 104 28,798 3,977 70,068
%5 3 0 4 1 6 1 0 0
Garut Total Rp. 55,769,315,362 2,855,756,600 60,566,083,380 2,588,750,000 121,779,905,342
Per Capita Rp. 24,514 1,255 26,623 1,138 53,530
%4 6 2 5 0 2 1 0 0
Subang Total Rp. 35,428,169,696 5,255,488,300 44,309,003,130 2,293,684,978 87,286,346,104
Per Capita Rp. 25,595 3,797 32,011 1,657 63,060
%4 1 6 5 1 3 1 0 0
Sukabumi Total Rp. 43,832,905,927 4,235,468,802 39,981,841,157 2,798,425,000 90,848,640,886
Per Capita Rp. 19,560 1,890 17,842 1,249 40,541
%4 8 5 4 4 3 1 0 0
5 districts Total Rp. 233,737,891,012 18,967,306,334 256,340,453,160 23,650,311,995 532,695,962,501
Per Capita Rp. 24,621 1,998 27,002 2,491 56,112
%4 4 4 4 8 4 1 0 0
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: Funds included in 'Other' are Loans and Grants.Health Research Policy and Systems 2009, 7:5 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/7/1/5
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Table 7: Expenditure (Rupiah) of public funds in health sector of 5 districts in Central Java Province by source of funds, 2006. (Note: 1 
US $ is equal to approximately Rp. 10,000).
District Source of public expenditure Total
District government Provincial government Central government Other
Brebes Total Rp. 31,176,108,000 18,040,000 38,745,942,000 117,543,000 70,057,633,000
Per capita Rp. 18,045 10 22,426 68 40,549
%4 5 0 5 5 0 1 0 0
Cilacap Total Rp. 41,032,210,000 0 27,439,830,000 0 68,472,040,000
Per capita Rp. 23,894 0 15,979 0 39,873
%6 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0
Jepara Total Rp. 39,394,861,000 549,720,000 31,414,180,000 0 71,358,761,000
Per capita Rp. 36,543 510 29,140 0 66,193
%5 5 1 4 4 0 1 0 0
Pemalang Total Rp. 44,257,660,000 0 38,737,409,000 0 82,995,069,000
Per capita Rp. 32,993 0 28,878 0 61,871
%5 3 0 4 7 0 1 0 0
Rembang Total Rp. 37,603,767,000 74,000,000 21,706,242,000 216,335,000 59,600,344,000
Per capita Rp 63,543 125 36,679 366 100,713
%6 3 0 3 6 0 1 0 0
5 districts Total Rp. 193,464,606,000 641,760,000 158,043,603,000 333,878,000 352,483,847,000
Per capita Rp 29,966 99 24,479 52 54,596
%5 5 0 4 5 0 1 0 0
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: Funds included in 'Other' are Loans and Grants which were low in this province in 2006.
Table 8: Expenditure (Rupiah) of public funds in health sector of 5 districts in East Java Province by source of funds, 2006. (Note: 1 US 
$ is equal to approximately Rp. 10,000)
District Source of public expenditure Total
District government Provincial government Central government Other
Jombang Total Rp. 44,927,109,165 0 39,827,901,347 1,424,756,412 86,179,766,924
Per capita Rp. 37,324 0 33,087 1,184 71,595
%5 2 0 4 6 2 1 0 0
Ngawi Total Rp. 12,834,992,053 0 40,267,935,189 224,420,000 53,327,347,242
Per capita Rp. 14,969 0 46,962 262 62,193
%2 4 0 7 6 0 1 0 0
Pamekasan Total Rp. 28,182,851,555 695,799,500 49,048,028,942 3,774,751,000 81,701,430,997
Per capita Rp. 35,997 889 62,648 4,821 104,355
%3 4 1 6 0 5 1 0 0
Sampang Total Rp. 12,618,332,276 495,001,500 24,709,504,397 2,394,618,295 40,217,456,468
Per capita Rp. 15,743 618 30,827 2,988 50,175
%3 1 1 6 1 6 1 0 0
Trenggalek Total Rp. 19,477,396,309 0 31,873,194,060 50,270,000 51,400,860,369
Per capita Rp. 28,546 0 46,712 74 75,332
%3 8 0 6 2 0 1 0 0
5 districts Total Rp. 118,040,681,358 1,190,801,000 185,726,563,935 7,868,815,707 312,826,862,000
Per capita Rp. 27,274 275 42,913 1,818 72,281
%3 8 0 5 9 3 1 0 0
15 districts Total Rp. 545,243,178,370 20,799,867,334 600,110,620,095 31,853,005,702 1,198,006,671,500
Per capita Rp. 26,889 1,026 29,595 1,571 59,080
%4 6 2 5 0 3 1 0 0
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: Funds included in 'Other' are Loans and GrantsHealth Research Policy and Systems 2009, 7:5 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/7/1/5
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rize the following with respect to salaries and remunera-
tion:
￿ Salaries and remuneration account for 40% of all
public expenditure for health at the district level, with
considerable variation between districts in the propor-
tion of salaries contributed by central and district gov-
ernments (Table 11).
￿ Funds from central government account for 66%
(see Table 12) of the total funds for salaries and remu-
neration – the staff for whom the central government
pays are predominantly permanent civil servants;
funds from the district government account for the
remaining 34% – the staff for whom the district gov-
ernment pays are predominantly not permanent civil
servants.
￿ Central government funds account for 52% (see
Table 9) of all public expenditure on health in the dis-
trict; of these central government funds, 53% is for sal-
aries and remuneration (see Table 11).
￿ A prominent feature of the results is the considerable
variation between districts on almost all funding
parameters.
Overall, the proportion of salaries and remuneration
accounted for by the central government will have risen
during 2007 and 2008 as many contract staff (mostly paid
for by the district) took up the offer to convert to perma-
nent civil servant status and will now be paid for from the
DAU.
District discretion over use of district level public funds for 
health
An important issue in the context of decentralization is
the extent to which districts have discretion over the use of
the public funds for health spent in the district. District
governments have no control over tied central govern-
Table 9: Source of public funds (%) for District health office, health centers and district hospitals across 15 districts in West and East 
Java Provinces, 2006.
Source District health office (%) Health Centers (%) District hospitals (%) Total (%)
District government 47 24 61 42
Provincial government 2 4 1 2
Central government 42 67 38 52
Other (Loans/grants) 10 6 0 4
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 10: Expenditure (Rupiah) and share (%) of public funds on the district health office + health centers and district hospitals in 15 
districts of West, Central and East Java Provinces, 2006. 
Province District District health office and health centers District hospitals
Rupiah Percent Rupiah Percent
West Ciamis 63,628,626,591 76 19,580,369,958 24
Java Cirebon 84,575,424,038 57 64,996,649,582 43
Garut 65,970,093,460 54 55,809,811,882 46
Subang 53,934,449,208 62 33,351,896,896 38
Sukabumi 53,565,197,905 59 37,283,442,981 41
Central Brebes 52,233,671,229 75 17,823,961,892 25
Java Cilacap 33,316,917,801 49 35,155,122,798 51
Jepara 32,230,879,000 45 39,127,881,501 55
Pemalang 47,620,495,537 57 35,374,273,486 43
Rembang 26,869,962,328 45 32,730,382,190 55
East Jombang 31,039,475,155 36 55,140,291,769 64
Java Ngawi 32,910,591,706 62 20,416,755,536 38
Pamekasan 39,382,283,562 48 42,319,147,435 52
Sampang 27,976,333,567 70 12,241,122,901 30
Trenggalek 36,455,528,470 71 14,945,331,899 29
Total for 15 districts 681,709,929,557 57 516,296,442,705 43
Source: Authors' calculations.
(Note: 1 US $ is equal to approximately Rp. 10,000)Health Research Policy and Systems 2009, 7:5 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/7/1/5
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ment funds (see Table 1 for details) allocated to specific
expenditures. For the DAU, salaries receive first preference
and the district has little control. Similarly the districts do
not have control over the tied grants from the center
through DAK, deconcentration and tugas pembantuan12,
or the other resources used to reimburse health facilities
for services to the poor and to public servants, and from
loans and grants which specify the way in which the funds
are to be used. Thus, an index of the extent to which the
districts can potentially have discretion over the funds
expended for health at the district level is to determine the
proportion that remains after subtracting funds that are
"centrally controlled"13. This is shown in Table 13 and
Figure 4. The important point here is that whilst overall
the proportion over which a district could potentially
exercise discretion varies from 23% in Ciamis to 63% in
Rembang (but overall is a seemingly reasonable 45%),
these figures hide a wide and systematic difference
between DHO/HC and hospitals. With only two excep-
tions (Ngawi and Trenggalek) hospitals have much greater
potential for discretion in use of their funds (63% overall)
than do the DHO/HC (31% overall). In general this cor-
relates with the proportion of salaries derived from the
central government (Table 12) and user charges at the
hospitals – the lower the proportion from the central gov-
ernment the greater the contribution from user charges,
the higher the potential for discretion in use of funds; and
as the proportion of salaries is highest for DHO/HC the
funds over which they potentially have discretion are
much lower.
Even though the data are summarized at the district level,
a unit with meaning within the Indonesian administrative
system, there is no overall view of the sector at that level
because it is fractured along at least four dimensions or
fault lines, all of which reflect funding in some way.
￿ Public/private – two-thirds of the funds expended in
the sector come from the private sector and one-third
from the public sector [3];
￿ District/center – only about half of all public funds
for health are spent at the district level (see Table 4);
Table 11: Remuneration as a proportion (%) of health expenditure by district and central governments and total district expenditure 
for health.
District District government Central government Total health expenditure
Subang 30 54 40
Garut 26 61 42
Ciamis 16 70 46
Cirebon 25 58 37
Sukabumi 19 51 32
Brebes 24 59 43
Jepara 32 66 46
Cilacap 43 47 45
Pemalang 16 54 34
Rembang 33 65 44
Ngawi 12 44 36
Jombang 42 46 43
Pamekasan 51 37 40
Sampang 45 29 32
Trenggalek 34 44 41
15 districts 30 53 40
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 12: Proportion of salaries derived from central 
government (APBN) and district government (APBD) 
expenditure by health institution and district. 2006
District DHO/HC Hospital Total
APBD APBN APBD APBN APBD APBN
Subang 0.09 0.91 0.63 0.37 0.31 0.69
Garut 0.03 0.97 0.67 0.33 0.28 0.72
Ciamis 0.02 0.98 0.31 0.69 0.08 0.92
Cirebon 0.11 0.89 0.62 0.38 0.36 0.64
Sukabumi 0.00 1.00 0.55 0.45 0.29 0.71
Brebes 0.16 0.84 0.53 0.47 0.25 0.75
Jepara 0.37 0.63 0.38 0.62 0.38 0.62
Cilacap 0.77 0.32 0.38 0.62 0.58 0.42
Pemalang 0.03 0.97 0.55 0.45 0.25 0.75
Rembang 0.12 0.88 0.71 0.29 0.47 0.53
Jombang 0.29 0.71 0.74 0.26 0.51 0.49
Ngawi 0.00 1.00 0.65 0.35 0.08 0.92
Pamekasan 0.29 0.71 0.51 0.49 0.44 0.56
Sampang 0.37 0.63 0.61 0.39 0.44 0.56
Trenggalek 0.26 0.74 0.46 0.54 0.32 0.68
15 districts 0.16 0.84 0.57 0.43 0.34 0.66
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: DHO/HC = District health office and health centers. APBD = 
district health expenditures using district funds. APBN = district 
health expenditures utilizing national funds.Health Research Policy and Systems 2009, 7:5 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/7/1/5
Page 11 of 14
(page number not for citation purposes)
￿ DHO/HC and hospital – within the district, public
funds for health are effectively divided between two insti-
tutions, the DHO/HC and the district hospital, between
which there is no coordination, they are funded sepa-
rately and administered separately (Table 10);
￿ Discretion/no discretion – across the 15 districts less
than half the public funds (Table 13) expended for
health at the district level are controlled by the district
government – in two districts it is less than one-
quarter14; the other half is controlled by the central
government which effectively dictates the way in
which they are used. Further, there are major differ-
ences between DHO/HC and hospitals in the poten-
tial for discretion in use of funds – the potential is
much greater in hospitals than in DHO/HC.
To summarize: on paper, of the public funds spent in the
district on health about half (Table 13) are apparently
controlled by the district, but these are divided between
the DHO/HC and the hospital. Moreover, some of these
apparently discretionary funds must be spent on inputs
that complement the fixed costs represented by the sala-
ries – medical consumables and utilities in particular. The
result is that there is limited discretion at the district level
on use of public funds for health, a conclusion consistent
with that reached by others [2]; the proportion overall is
probably less than one-third and would be much lower
for DHO/HC15. The room for innovation and change by
the public sector to address local problems is very limited
and will become even more so if the government contin-
ues to increase the number of permanent public servants
in the sector, thereby reducing the proportion of public
Table 13: Proportion of public sector health expenditure in 
district over which district can possibly can exercise discretion
DHO/HC Hospital Total
Subang 0.22 0.68 0.40
Garut 0.19 0.77 0.46
Ciamis 0.13 0.58 0.23
Cirebon 0.34 0.73 0.51
Sukabumi 0.36 0.64 0.48
Brebes 0.35 0.71 0.45
Jepara 0.44 0.64 0.55
Cilacap 0.45 0.57 0.51
Pemalang 0.35 0.78 0.53
Rembang 0.50 0.74 0.63
Jombang 0.41 0.61 0.54
Ngawi 0.28 0.17 0.24
Pamekasan 0.26 0.43 0.34
Sampang 0.27 0.42 0.31
Trenggalek 0.41 0.31 0.38
15 districts 0.31 0.63 0.45
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: the proportion of funds over which the district could 
potentially have control is equal to 1.00 minus the proportion of 
centrally controlled funds (DAU for salaries, DAK, Dekon, Tugas 
pembantuan, Askeskin, Askes PNS, loans and grants). These various 
funds are defined in Table 1.
Proportion of health spending in District Health Office/Health Center and District Hospital over which district can potentially  exercise discretion Figure 4
Proportion of health spending in District Health Office/Health Center and District Hospital over which district 
can potentially exercise discretion.
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funds at the district level over which the district govern-
ment could potentially exercise discretion.
Apart from the limited control by the district government
over use of public funds for health, there are, in effect, no
mechanisms which enable taking a view of the sector as a
whole at any level, and especially at the district level. Cen-
tral control over salaries, the Special Allocation Fund, the
deconcentration and tugas pembantuan funds, all mean
that individual institutions and district administrations
react to single lines of funding from the center; no one has
an incentive to view the sector as a whole. At the same time
there are perverse incentives for the district in the current
funding formulas – full coverage by the central government
of the wage bill for permanent civil servants at the district
level provides a disincentive for district governments to
streamline and modernize their civil services [2]. Although
there is a strong case for reform of these tied funds to allow
district administrations the flexibility to respond to the
local health problems and incentives to introduce reforms,
strong opposition from vested interests in the central gov-
ernment has so far managed to delay any reforms.
For many years the constant excuse given for the mediocre
performance of the Indonesian health system was that the
public funds allocated to it were just too few, it was not
possible (so it was argued) to improve services without a
major increase in funds and that the straight-jacket of cen-
tral control and one-size-fits-all precluded local level
responses to local situations. The increased funding that
came with decentralization is, in one way, a robust
response to these claims. Between 2000 and 2006 the cen-
tral government funds transferred to district governments
almost doubled in real terms. Over the same period
expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP went from
0.50% to 0.95% [2]. Yet there is great variation between
districts in the efficiency with which public resources are
used [5], no relation between health system output and
public expenditure [3], and there seems to have been little
improvement in performance of the health system16 with
the increased public funds and decentralization, begging
the question as to why this has been the case?
Part of the answer lies in the fact that the overall public
system in place today is much the same as the one in place
before decentralization. And this is a system that was not
designed to permit, let alone encourage, local level deci-
sion making. The system was designed to implement cen-
tral decisions, not local ones. There is still a tendency,
encouraged and reinforced by the central ministry, for the
districts to look to the center on major issues – until this
changes progress at the district level will be slow.
Part of the answer to the question, as indicated by this study
and other analyses of the sector as a whole [2], is that there
has been, in effect, very little decentralization in the health
sector, in the sense that the district is now the place where the
decisions about the use of public money are made. Far from
it. Most of the critical decisions are still made by the central
government. The central government hires and pays perma-
nent civil servants, a move that allows it to control the overall
direction of the service and which, at the same time provides
a disincentive for districts to reform the sector – why attempt
to improve the low productivity of the sector staff when the
central government will continue to pay? Apart from paying
for, and eventually controlling, the most important resource
in the sector, the central government also controls critical
sector development through decisions about other tied
sources of funding. In that sense little has changed. It is true
that districts are now more autonomous in that they no
longer respond to orders from the center in the ways they did
during the Suharto era. It is true that the role of the province
has been greatly reduced and that districts can now ignore
the province if they wish. It is true that the central govern-
ment continues to issue new laws and regulations on
decentralization17. But for all intents and purposes key deci-
sions about money are still made by the central government,
and no one is held accountable for the performance of the
sector – the district blames the center and the central minis-
tries (and their ministers) are not accountable to district pop-
ulations.
What the sector needs now is some real decentralization,
such that the district government has real discretion over,
say, 75% of the public funds in the health sector, including
funds for salaries, and is held accountable through transpar-
ent agreements with the central government for the sector
performance. Under the present arrangement the district can
always blame the center for its performance – levels of fund-
ing are not sufficient, staff levels and salaries are decisions
made by the central government, it is difficult to plan when
the central government retains so much control.
For districts to be more accountable, the sector needs to
change in such a way that the fracture lines are reduced.
Two-thirds of funding for health is private so the sector
needs to be managed as a whole; it is the districts where
services are delivered, districts governments are responsi-
ble for the health services and need discretion over most
of the public funds for health; health centers and hospitals
are part of an overall health system and districts need to
manage and coordinate the services they offer in conjunc-
tion with those available through the private sector. And
all of this is occurring in the context of the relentless pres-
sure from the epidemiological and demographic transi-
tion and the consequent changes in the amount and type
of care required.
There are two pre-requisites for greater coordination of the sec-
tor as a whole at the district level – central government control
needs to be at a minimum and that means allowing, even
encouraging, the district to make decisions about the sector.Health Research Policy and Systems 2009, 7:5 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/7/1/5
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That in turn means that the district needs to develop a long
term view of where the health sector is going and how it is
going to get there. The district has never been asked to do that
before so it is not surprising that the skills and background to
do so are not present at the moment. There is clearly a role for
the center here – to provide leadership which sets goals and
broad guidelines for the sector, promotes local approaches to
local problems and introduces incentives for districts (and the
provinces) to collaborate on matters where economies of scale
and external effects should be addressed. This can best be
approached by controlling a limited proportion (no more
than 25%) of the public expenditure and using it in a strategic
manner to provide incentives for districts to achieve a limited
number of national objectives and priorities. So far the center
is not providing that leadership either. In fact, the goal seems
to be to re-gain as much central control as possible, a goal that,
in effect turns back the clock on decentralization in a vast and
diversified country.
Finally, this paper has shown that there is a lot of variation
between districts on most of the variables examined.
There is, likewise, considerable variation in the human
resources for health [8] and health facilities [8,11] [Hey-
wood P, Harahap N: Health facilities at the district level in
Indonesia, unpublished.] in these same districts and in
the effectiveness with which public funds are used. What
is important now is examining why these differences have
arisen and how they are influencing delivery of services,
health care and health outcomes, and the implications for
the health system in the future.
Conclusion
During the Suharto era public funding of health in Indone-
sia was low and the health services were tightly controlled
by the central government; district health staff had practi-
cally no discretion over expenditure. Following the down-
fall of President Suharto there was a radical political,
administrative and fiscal decentralization with delivery of
services becoming the responsibility of district govern-
ments. In addition, public funding for health services more
than doubled between 2001 and 2006. It was widely
expected that services would improve as district govern-
ments now had more adequate funds and the responsibil-
ity for services. To date there has been little improvement in
services. Understanding why services have not improved
requires careful study of what is happening at the district
level. The public expenditure information collected in 15
districts as part of this study indicates district governments
are reliant on the central government for as much as 90%
of their revenue; that approximately half public expendi-
ture on health is at the district level; that at least 40% of dis-
trict level public expenditure on health is for personnel,
almost all of them permanent civil servants; and that dis-
tricts have discretion over less than one-third of district
public expenditure on health; the extent of discretion over
spending is much higher in district hospitals; in contrast,
district health offices and health centers have discretion
over the use of less than a quarter of public funds for health.
The current trend is for the proportion of public funds over
which the districts have discretion to decrease. There is con-
siderable variation between districts. In contradiction to the
promise of decentralization there has been little increase in
the potential for discretion at the district level in managing
public funds for health – this is likely to be an important
reason for the lack of improvement in publicly funded
health services. Key decisions about money are still made
by the central government, and no one is held accountable
for the performance of the sector – the district blames the
center and the central ministries (and their ministers) are
not accountable to district populations.
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Appendix 1. Endnotes
1 The largest component of public spending on health in
Indonesia is undertaken through the Ministry of Health
(MOH) and related arms of government at the provincial
and district levels. Although other government depart-
ments also make some expenditures related to health, the
total amounts are small relative to that of the MOH and
are not included in the funds discussed in this paper.
2 See, for example, World Bank [1] which states "......In the
new system, central-regional transfers remain the domi-
nant means of financing, but the earmarking is gone."
(emphasis added).
3 Revenues from natural resources are concentrated in oil
producing regions, none of which are on the island of Java
[2].
4 Within a district, funds to the DHO and HCs are through
a single budget document proposed by the District Health
Office, reviewed by the District Planning Office and
approved by the district parliament. The HCs are admin-
istratively responsible to the DHO. In contrast, the district
hospital(s) reports directly to the Head of the District and
has a separate budget document which is proposed and
approved separately from that for the DHO/HC.
5 The actual name of this document varies between dis-
tricts and health institutions but all responded readily to
our requests for the financial report on expenditure for
2006.Health Research Policy and Systems 2009, 7:5 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/7/1/5
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6 The person most familiar with the financial report for
2006 also varied between districts and health institutions.
In most hospitals it was the chief budget officer while in
district health offices it was usually, but not always, the
chief planning officer.
7 'Salaries and remuneration' expenditures are defined as
including: salaries for all staff in the institution (district
health office, health center, hospital; fee-for-service dis-
tributed to staff; overtime; honoraria (for projects, train-
ing, special activities, seminars, workshops); civil service
allowances (e.g. food and welfare allowances).
8 'Other' refers to expenditures apart from salaries and
remuneration and includes expenditures for: non-salary
administrative activities, program activities, civil works,
drugs, and equipment.
9 The work of which this report forms a part looks at 15
districts on Java. However, the public finance database
maintained by the World Bank has complete data for only
12 of these districts and it is those districts discussed in
this section.
10 See Endnote 4.
11 See Endnote 7 for definition.
12 See Table 1 for a definition of these various sources of
funds.
13 Thus, the proportion of funds over which the district
potentially has control is equal to 1.00 minus the propor-
tion of centrally controlled funds (DAU for salaries, DAK,
Dekon, Tugas pembantuan, Askeskin, Askes PNS, loans
and grants). These various funds are defined in Table 1.
14 In both these districts – Ciamis and Ngawi – the propor-
tion of all salaries accounted for by the central govern-
ment is over 90%.
15 The broader context is that only one-third of the funds
expended in the health sector are public [3]; about half
the public funds for health (from central, provincial and
district sources) are spent at the district level (Table 4);
and then no more than one-third of the public funds at
the district level are discretionary. Thus, discretionary
public sector funds for health at the district level represent
as little as one-eighteenth (1/3 × 1/2 × 1/3) (approxi-
mately 5%) of total health expenditure.
16 Changes in performance of the health system between
2002–03 and 2007 in the 10 districts in East Java and Cen-
tral Java included in this study will be addressed in [Hey-
wood, P. Changes in health system performance in 10
districts in Java, Indonesia, unpublished.]. The study will
use a comparison between the results of the Demographic
and Health Survey (DHS) in these years when over sam-
pling in the 10 districts allowed estimates of selected
health indicators at the district level.
17 For example, Law 32 in 2004 and Law 33 in 2004 as
well as government regulation (PP) Number 7 in 2008.
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